“The story of Kosovo’s independence is considered a closed chapter in Bosnia and other than the official position that we will not recognize its statehood, there is not much else we can say about it,” political analyst Zoran Zuza told Balkan Insight.
“Regardless of the ICJ’s opinion on the issue, I do not expect it to have any implications on political developments within Bosnia,” he added.
Thousands of Bosnian Serbs took to the streets to protest Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008. The protesters insisted that Bosnia’s Serb dominated part Republika Srpska should follow Kosovo’s lead by breaking away from the rest of the country and eventually becoming a part of Serbia.
At the time, Republika Srpska’s lawmakers threatened to hold a referendum on secession from Bosnia if a majority of UN and the European Union member states recognized Kosovo’s independence.
However, while never shy to use the talk of secession to win popular support, Bosnian Serb leaders have since significantly toned down their rhetoric on Kosovo, displaying unexpected reluctance to link the future of Serbia’s breakaway province with that of their semi-independent statelet within Bosnia.
Zuza believes this is unlikely to change following the ICJ’s ruling on Thursday especially since “Serbia has repeatedly stressed that it supports Bosnia's territorial integrity and that [its president Boris] Tadic and [his Croatian counterpart Ivo] Josipovic are clearly committed to easing the situation in the region“.
During Josipovic's first official visit to Serbia last weekend, the two presidents reiterated this position, saying that their countries supported Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty and expected its constituent Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim), Croat and Serb people to reach compromises on how to make their state more functional.
In a surprising rebuke of this statement, the Croat member of Bosnia's tripartite presidency, Zeljko Komsic, told local media that Croatia and Serbia should not be discussing his country's fate, but would do better to deal with their own problems.
“I thank them for their good wishes. I too support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia and Serbia without Kosovo,“ Komsic told FENA news agency.
Komsic's statement infuriated Bosnian Serbs, who pointed out that it contradicted Bosnia's official position not to recognize Kosovo's independence, and prompted Belgrade to send a protest note to Sarajevo.
However, the statement was also quickly rejected by other Bosnian Croat and Bosniak officials.
“Such statements do not contribute to dialogue...in any normal country political leaders carefully measure their statements and agree on common positions, here this is unfortunately not the case,“ Sulejman Tihic, the leader of the strongest Bosniak party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), told media.
The head of one of the strongest Bosnian Croat parties, the Croat Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990), Martin Raguz, also dismissed Komsic's outburst, saying that Bosnia “does not need statements which stoke tensions rather than contribute to the climate of dialogue.”
With Bosnia's general elections approaching, any issue “can be used to heighten nationalist rhetoric and whoever wants to destabilize the country can use any reason to do so, or they can even do it without a reason,“ political analyst Zlatko Hadzidedic told Balkan Insight.
However, Hadzidedic said that “from a legal point of view, (Kosovo's) unilateral declaration of independence and its international recognition were not a useful precedent for Bosnia.”
While not excluding the possibility that some in Bosnia could “try to play with this issue”, Hadzidedic said that there was an overall understanding among the country's leaders that talking about recognizing Kosovo's independence was not “useful.“
Zuza agreed with Hadzidedic and added that it was equally unlikely that Bosnian Serb leaders would openly defy Serbia's position on the future of their country and use the example of Kosovo as an argument in favor of Republika Srpska's secession from Bosnia.
“I doubt that any Bosnian Serb leader can take the risk of challenging Serbia because it as an axiom that Serbia is Republika Spska's motherland who must not be opposed,“ Zuza said.
Undisputed Bosnian Serb leader and prime minister of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik “had a chance two years ago to insist that (Bosnia’s Serb dominated) entity could claim the same right to independence as Kosovo did, but he chose not to use it,“ Zuza said.
“I doubt he would do it now against the wishes of Boris Tadic,“ he added.
Ever since the Dayton peace agreement ended Bosnia’s 1992-95 war by splitting the country into two largely autonomous entities, the Republika Srpska and Muslim-Croat federation, nationalist statements have been a useful tool for winning popular support.
With Bosnia’s general elections scheduled for October 3, there is some danger that the ICJ opinion will be used by some political leaders, particularly in Republika Srpska, to increase ethnic tensions, argues Sretko Latal, an analyst on Bosnia with the International Crisis Group think tank.
“But it is more than clear to everyone that given Serbia’s position on Bosnia, the idea that there could be some link between Kosovo and Republika Srpska has no chance of being accepted and could possibly even backfire against those who would try to use it,” Latal said.
He added that regardless of what the ICJ’s opinion on Kosovo’s independence is, it will not change the realities on the ground. This, Latal maintained, will force Serbia and Kosovo to talk and find mutually acceptable solutions for their problems.
“Such talks would clearly take time, but if they are conducted in an intelligent and peaceful way, with facilitation but not interventionism by the international community, they could set a positive example for the rest of the region,” Latal concluded.
Some express concern over possible fallout in Macedonia
In February 2008, when Kosovo declared independence, many ethnic Albanians from neighbouring Macedonia headed out into the streets to celebrate. One quarter of Macedonian residents are ethnic Albanian and their general support for an independent Kosovo was evident.
However, the Macedonian government was at first reluctant to recognise the newly established Kosovo, largely for fear of souring relations with Serbia. When Skopje did recognise Kosovo on October 9, 2008, it did not send an ambassador to Pristina straight away, a move that met with some dissatisfaction among the ethnic Albanian community.
More than a year after recognising Kosovo, Macedonia opened its embassy in Pristina in March 2010.
Slagjan Penev, the director of the Forum Center for Strategic Research, told Balkan Insight that regardless of the ICJ ruling it is unlikely that the authorities in Skopje will change their decision to recognise Kosovo.
“What is done is done. There is no going back especially because the decision to recognise Kosovo was reached in close coordination with the big international powers who are key strategic partners of Macedonia,” Penev said.
He noted that for Macedonia it would be best if the status quo is maintained in Kosovo and there are no new talks of possible secession or greater autonomy for Serbs living there because such developments could spill over into Macedonia, where some have voiced concern that the ethnic Albanian community could demand similar steps.
“The Albanians in Macedonia have felt underprivileged for the last few years due to the ignorant attitude of the current authorities in power. The inter-ethnic committee [where ethnic issues in the country yare addressed] is essentially non-functional and all decisions in the sphere of ethnic relations are reached in conspiracy between Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and his ethnic Albanian coalition partner Ali Ahmeti [of the Democratic Union for Integraton, DUI].
However, Penev argued that for the time being calm is likely to prevail because of the willingness to cooperate shown by the DUI and because ethnic Albanian opposition parties do not have the strength to cause a wider turn among ethnic Albanians in the direction of secession.
While Macedonia did not suffer the scale of ethnic conflict seen in other former Yugoslav states in the 1990s, the country did see a short lived armed conflict in 2001 between state security forces and ethnic Albanian rebel groups. The clash ended the same year with the signing of a peace deal that envisaged greater rights for the Albanian community while at the same time ensuring the unitary and multiethnic character of the state.
According to Penev, the regional fallout from developments in Kosovo "will all depend on the credibility of NATO and US diplomacy. If their policy is well focused they can reach some kind of solution for Kosovo and still keep things under control in Macedonia, Bosnia and Serbia.”
For more on this, please see: Kosovo, Serbia Prepare For Post-ICJ Battle
Both communities in Kosovo blame politics for the trial of Fatmir Limaj - though from diametrically opposing points of view.